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Abstract 
Should constraints on urban expansion be relaxed because of external agglomeration 
economies? In a system of heterogeneous cities, we demonstrate that second-best land use 
policy consists of a tax on city creation and a subsidy (tax) on urban development in cities in 
which the marginal-average productivity gap is above (below) average. However, the 
implementation of this policy requires coordination at the system level. A tax on city creation 
does not raise welfare if development taxes are set decentrally by competitive urban 
developers, nor does correction of these taxes raise welfare if a tax on city creation is 
unavailable. In the resulting constrained optimal allocation, urban development is subsidized 
in all cities. The quantitative significance of these findings is explored in an application of 
our model. 
 
Keywords:  Agglomeration externalities, growth controls, second-best policy, systems of 
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1 Introduction 
 
Economies of agglomeration are key to the success of cities. Their external nature leaves 
scope for policy intervention: markets would not by themselves take sufficient advantage of 
sharing, matching and learning in dense areas. In the absence of instruments that directly 
address the relevant failures, land use policy is an obvious second-best candidate, being an 
important determinant of the size and shape of cities. How exactly this policy should be 
geared to the presence of agglomeration externalities is the central topic of this paper.  
 In the setting of a system of heterogeneous cities, we consider two channels through 
which land use policy could further the exploitation a Marshallian externality in production. 
The first is a constraint on city creation, which raises the size of remaining cities in the 
system. The developer of a new city does not internalize the loss of external agglomeration 
economies in existing places from which its inhabitants are drawn, so that there are too many 
cities in a market equilibrium. This result runs counter to the conventional wisdom that cities 
are too large and that their creation should be supported by national governments, such as in 
the New Town programs that have been adopted in various European countries. 
 As a second channel, we analyse the adjustment of constraints and subsidies on 
residential development in existing cities. Provided that the number of cities is either fixed or 
optimized, the gain of relaxing land use policy in one place should be offset against foregone 
agglomeration benefits elsewhere. Hence, land use policy should be adjusted so as to direct 
households to places in which the external agglomeration benefit is comparably high. The 
potential gains depend on the degree of heterogeneity across cities and on the strength of 
nonlinearities in the relationship between productivity and city size.  
 Is it possible to decentralize the second-best land use policy to competitive urban 
developers who maximize the total differential rent in their own city? Such developers do not 
have the incentive to consider the costs imposed elsewhere when relaxing land use policy. 
Uncoordinated competition thus leads to an outcome in which development is subsidized in 
each city, until the opportunity costs of developed land offset the external productivity gains 
at the margin. We demonstrate that this outcome can only be improved upon if it is possible to 
constrain the creation of new cities and if land use policy in each city can be coordinated 
through planning at the national level. Limits on the number of cities do not enhance welfare 
if coordination of urban land use policies fails, nor can welfare be raised by correcting the 
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outcome of uncoordinated competition amongst urban developers if there is no constraint on 
city creation.  
 These results are of interest in view of the considerable heterogeneity in institutions 
across countries. For instance, land use policy is coordinated at the national level in countries 
like the UK and the Netherlands, but planning is mainly a local affair in the US. In particular, 
the process of city creation is typically coordinated by national governments in Europe, yet 
incorporation of municipalities is largely the product of bottom-up government in the US 
(Fischel, 2001). Our analysis thus suggests an explanation for why many US cities fail to 
charge the full cost of infrastructure provision, giving rise to what is commonly perceived as 
excessive urban sprawl.1 In the absence of a coordinated national land use policy, these 
subsidies on urban development may be a rational way to enhance the exploitation of external 
agglomeration economies.  
 The theoretical part of this paper is augmented with a numerical application that 
illustrates the main mechanisms in our model and provides a crude sense of their quantitative 
significance. We contrast equilibrium outcomes under the second-best land use policy and 
under uncoordinated competition amongst urban developers, as well as under the outcome 
that obtains when land use policy ignores the existence of agglomeration externalities 
altogether. By evaluating welfare in these alternative outcomes, we are able to shed some 
light on the potential gains of tailoring land use policy to the presence of external 
agglomeration economies. 
 
 
2 Background 
 
Optimal land use policy in the presence of agglomeration externalities is rarely addressed in 
the urban economics literature. One notable exception is Rossi-Hansberg (2004), who 
considers zoning of land to business and residential use within an open city, when 
agglomeration externalities are localized as in the Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) model. 
He finds that zoning raises productivity by enhancing the spatial concentration of firms, 
which is insufficient in the equilibrium allocation. Our paper adds to these results by 
                                                 
1
 Brueckner (2000) argues that under common financing arrangements in the US, the infrastructure-related tax 
burden on new homeowners is typically less than the actual infrastructure costs they generate, because the cost 
of new sewers and schools is shared among all of the city’s residents rather than charged directly to those who 
require the new infrastructure.  
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investigating how land use policy may be used to enhance the concentration of employment in 
a system of cities.  
 In the context of a system of two cities that differ in an exogenous amenity, Anas and 
Pines (2008a) address second-best urban growth boundaries in the presence of unpriced traffic 
congestion. They find that the size of the high-amenity city should be restricted and it should 
be enhanced it in the low-amenity city. Treating agglomeration as the mirror image of 
congestion and assuming that the externality increases with city size, this is consistent with 
our result that development should be subsidized (taxed) in cities with a high (low) marginal 
average productivity gap in a system in which the number of cities is fixed. Considering a 
system of an endogenous number of replicable cities, Anas and Pines (2008b) show that 
imposing an urban growth boundary in all cities is a second-best policy in the presence of 
unpriced traffic congestion. This mirrors our finding that urban development should be 
subsidized in all cities when a tax on city creation is unavailable.  
 Kanemoto (2011) considers the benefits from investment in urban transportation in a 
system of identical cities that is augmented with a rural sector, where external agglomeration 
economies derive from monopolistic competition with differentiated products. Keeping the 
total urban population and the number of cities fixed, he shows that external productivity 
gains from infrastructure investment in one city are fully offset by losses elsewhere in the 
system. This result closely resembles our finding that welfare cannot be raised by subsidizing 
development relative to its first-best level in a system of a fixed number of identical cities. 
Migration from the rural area mitigates the offsetting effect in his model, while the impact of 
city creation depends on whether cities are too large or too small. As in our analysis, results 
for an optimal number of cities are identical to the case of a fixed number of cities.  
 Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) explore the role for national governments in strengthening 
the economies of particular localities or regions. They show in a spatial general equilibrium 
framework that it may be welfare enhancing to relocate people to areas where agglomeration 
economies are comparably high, which is consistent with our finding that development should 
be subsidized (taxed) when the gap between the marginal and the average product of labour is 
above (below) average in a system with a fixed number of cities. Welfare may be similarly 
raised by relocating people to areas where the elasticity of congestion with respect to 
population size is comparably low. The analytical framework is applied to both infrastructure 
investment and land use policy. Empirically, however, the authors find that nonlinearities in 
agglomeration and congestion externalities are difficult to identify, so that ‘place-making 
policy’ is deemed a risky affair.  
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 None of the aforementioned papers considers constraints on city creation as an explicit 
policy instrument to enhance exploitation of external agglomeration economies. In contrast, 
Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004) survey a literature contending that city formation is 
inefficiently slow. This literature assumes that there is no coordination of intercity migration, 
while scale economies make moving to a new place attractive only if a number of households 
migrate at the same time. Existing cities may thus become grossly overpopulated before new 
cities emerge, calling for government involvement in the setup of new cities. The New Towns 
that have been founded in several European countries may be regarded as a way to address 
this problem (Anas et al., 1998). However, Henderson and Venables (2009) show that the 
coordination problem may also be overcome by competitive forward-looking investors who 
supply the sunk capital, like public infrastructure, housing and business capital, that is 
indispensable for urban growth. 
  The few existing papers that perform an applied welfare analysis of urban land use use 
constraints ignore the existence of agglomeration externalities (see e.g. Cheshire and 
Sheppard, 2002, or Walsh, 2007). Whether this leads to an underestimation of costs depends, 
as our analysis shows, on how the cities under consideration compare to others in terms of the 
marginal-average productivity gap, as well as on the institutions that govern the setup of new 
cities. The application of our model sheds some light on the quantitative significance of the 
external productivity effects relative to the direct costs of land use policy.   
 
 
3 Theory 
 
We conceptualize land use policy in a system of cities as a set of possibly negative city-
specific taxes on conversion of agricultural land to urban use and a tax on creating new cities.2 
This means that we abstract from direct regulations of urban density, for instance through 
minimum lot size zoning, and only consider their impeding effect on urban expansion. 
Conditional on this policy, competitive markets allocate land and all other goods and services. 
Land use policy is set by a benevolent planner at the system level or, equivalently, by an 
absentee owner of all land in the system. First-order conditions for optimal policy are derived 
and we consider the decentralization to planners or absentee landowners (urban developers) at 
                                                 
2
 Taxes may be interpreted as shadow prices of direct land use regulation, which is more often observed in 
practice. In the case of negative taxes, direct land use constraints would not be binding, but as discussed in the 
introduction, subsidies on urban development are a common phenomenon at least in the US. 
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the city level. Throughout this section, direct benefits of constraints on urban expansion are 
ignored, so in a first-best world the optimal development tax would be zero everywhere. This 
simplifying assumption allows us to focus on the implications of agglomeration externalities 
for land use policy in a second-best world.  
 
3.1 Equilibrium outcome conditional on land use policy 
 
In order to characterize the outcome of a general equilibrium at the system level, we first 
establish the outcome on land and labour markets in an open city conditional on land use 
policy. The system of cities consists of a set of open cities on which a population constraint is 
imposed. The number of cities in the system will initially be treated as given, but city creation 
will be endogenized in section 3.3.  
 
Urban land market equilibrium in an open city 
Households are assumed to be homogeneous and they derive utility ( ), , iU s z A  from the 
consumption of land s, a composite commodity z, and a city-specific exogenous amenity Ai, 
where i indexes the set of cities in the system. Households must reach a system-wide utility 
level u, which will be treated as exogenous. This condition implicitly defines ( ), , iZ u s A  as 
the consumption of z required for a household in city i with land consumption of s. 
Households receive a lump-sum transfer T and in the central business district (CBD) of the 
city, they exchange one unit of labour for a wage wi. Respecting its budget constraint, the 
maximum amount a household can afford to pay for a unit land at distance r from the CBD 
equals: 
( ) ( ), ,, , max i ii i
s
w T tr Z u s A
w r T
s
+ − −
Ψ = ,       (1) 
where t denotes transport costs per unit of distance and the price of z is normalized to one. 
Expression (1) defines the bid rent function, which determines land rents in a spatial 
equilibrium. At each distance r, the first order condition associated with this maximization 
problem is: 
( ) ( ), , , ,i i iZ u s A w T tr Z u s A
s s
∂ + − −
− =
∂
,       (2) 
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and the argument that solves it is denoted by ( ), ,i is w r T . Expression (2) states the usual 
condition that the marginal rate of substituting the composite commodity for land should 
equal their rate of exchange at market prices.  
Land is converted from agricultural to urban use if the bid rent exceeds annualized 
opportunity costs Ci (conversion costs and value of land in alternative use) and a development 
tax τi. Hence, at the urban fringe it must hold that: 
( ), ,i i i iw r T C τΨ = + .          (3) 
This condition implicitly defines the function ( ), ,Fi i ir w Tτ , which characterizes the distance 
from the CBD to the fringe of the city. 
Finally, for future reference, we derive the surface of the residential area in this city as: 
( ) ( )
( ), ,
0
, ,
F
i i ir w T
i i i iS w T L r dr
τ
τ = ∫ ,        (4) 
where ( )iL r  denotes the length of the arc at distance r from the CBD that is available for 
residential use.  
 
Urban labour market equilibrium in an open city 
Since each household supplies one unit of labour, the urban labour supply equals the 
household density integrated over the residential sector of the city: 
( ) ( )( )
( ), ,
0
, ,
, ,
F
i i ir w T
i
i i i
i i
L r
N w T dr
s w r T
τ
τ = ∫ .       (5) 
Equation (5) implicitly defines the inverse labour supply function ( ), ,i iw N Tτ , which gives 
the wage that employers in the CBD should offer in order to attract N units of labour supply.  
 Labour is the single input in the production of a good that is traded on international 
markets for a price normalized to unity, employing a production technology of the following 
shape: 
( ) ( )NNgNF = ,          (6) 
where ( )g N  may be thought of as an increasing concave function of urban employment. The 
marginal product of labour is ( ) ( )NNgNg '+ . Individual firms are so small that they ignore 
the impact of wage setting on N and pay labour its average product ( )Ng . Hence, the inverse 
labour demand function is given by: 
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( ) ( )w N g N= ,          (7) 
which results in the conventional Marshallian externality that is compatible with competitive 
equilibrium.3 
 A stable urban labour market equilibrium is characterised by the conditions that Ni and 
wi are chosen such that labour supply equals demand and that at this point, the cost of 
attracting labour rises more steeply than its average product. We denote the equilibrium 
labour supply by ( ),i iN Tτ  and the equilibrium wage by ( ),i iw Tτ .4  
 
General equilibrium in a system of cities 
A general equilibrium in open city i occurs when the urban land and labour markets clear 
simultaneously. Bid rents ( ), ,i ir TτΨ , lot sizes ( ), ,i is r Tτ , the urban fringe ( ),Fi ir Tτ , and 
residential surface ( ),i iS Tτ , as functions of r, τi and T only, are obtained by substituting 
( ),i iw Tτ  into expressions (1), (3) and (4) respectively.  
The system of cities consists of a set of open cities indexed by i, i = 1, ..., n, which 
jointly accommodate an exogenous number of households N . Note that we require all 
households to live in cities, there is no rural sector in our model. The implied population 
constraint reads: 
( )
1
,
n
i i
i
N T Nτ
=
=∑ .          (8) 
This condition implicitly determines the transfer level ( )T τ , where we denote ( )1,..., nτ τ τ≡ . 
The system general equilibrium is defined as the set of open city general equilibrium 
allocations evaluated at ( )T T τ=  .  
It should be noted here that we consider compensated equilibria in which the 
population constraint is met through adjustment of T, while keeping u at a constant level.5 The 
reason is that keeping households equally well off in each scenario allows us to evaluate 
different policies in welfare economic terms by employing a money metric that is readily 
                                                 
3
 This approach may be interpreted as a reduced form of more complex and possibly more realistic models of 
agglomeration externalities, see for instance discussions in Duranton and Puga (2004) or Kanemoto (2011). 
4
 Existence and uniqueness properties depend on functional forms, so we will only verify them in the calibrated 
version of our model.  
5
 Each compensated equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium in which T is held fixed and in which 
market interaction leads to an equilibrium utility level such that condition (8) is fulfilled.  
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available and easy to interpret: the social surplus, defined below as the difference between the 
value of the produce and all costs needed to attain it.  
 
Social surplus 
The costs of ensuring attainment of the target utility level for all households consist of 
transport costs, the purchase of composite commodities, the purchase of agricultural land and 
the cost of converting it. For city i, they may be written as: 
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( )
( )( ),
0
, , , ,
, ,
F
i ir T
r i i
i i i i
r i
tr Z u s r T A
C C L r dr
s r T
τ τ τ τ
τ
τ τ
 +
 = +
 
 
∫
 
 .    (9) 
Social surplus is obtained by subtracting these costs from ( )( )iF N τ , the value of the produce 
in this city. Summing over all cities in the system, we rewrite it as:  
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
,
1 0
, ,
F
i ir Tn
i i i i
i
SS r T C L r dr NT
τ τ
τ τ τ τ
=
= Ψ − −∑ ∫

  
.    (10) 
This may be seen by writing the total produce as the average product of labour times the 
household density, integrated over the entire residential area.  
 The exogenous utility level may be chosen in such a way that no transfers are required 
for attaining it if τmaximizes social surplus. In that case, social surplus equals the total 
differential land rent, defined as the difference between the total land revenue and its 
opportunity costs. The problem of a planner who sets τ  so as to maximize social surplus is 
thus seen to coincide with the problem of a profit-maximizing absentee landlord who owns all 
the land in the system.  
 
3.2 Optimal land use policy for a fixed number of cities 
 
The first-best allocation in this model is well-known: wages should be subsidized with a city-
specific amount ( ) ( )( )'i iN g Nτ τ  , so as to bridge the gap between marginal and average 
product. Since this subsidy internalizes all external effects, urban development and city 
creation should not be taxed or subsidized. The first-best allocation could be decentralized to 
urban developers who finance the wage subsidy exactly from the total differential land rent, 
following the Henry George theorem (see e.g., Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004). In practice, 
however, the nature of agglomeration externalities is highly complex and difficult to observe, 
which may explain why urban wage subsidies are rarely used as an instrument. Hence, we 
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assume that appropriate first-best instruments are unavailable in this paper, and we investigate 
the implications for optimal land use policy.6  
 The following lemma characterizes the effect on surplus of a marginal rise in the 
development tax.  
 
Lemma 1: In a system general equilibrium for a fixed number of cities, the total cost of a 
marginal change in development tax in city i is given by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), , ,
,
i i i
i i
i i i i
S T N T N TSS τ τ τ τ τ ττ
τ
τ τ τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂∂
= + ∆ − Λ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  
   (11) 
where ( ) ( )( )'i i iN g Nτ τ∆ ≡    is the gap between the marginal and the average product of 
labour and Λ is the shadow price of the population constraint (8). This shadow price may 
be decomposed as 1 2Λ = Λ + Λ , where 
( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 1
, ,n nj j j j
j
j j
S T N T
T T
τ τ τ τ
τ
= =
∂ ∂
Λ ≡
∂ ∂∑ ∑
 
      (12) 
is the gain in land surplus at the fringe of constrained cities from adding one additional 
household to the system and  
( )( ) ( )( )
2
1 1
, ,n nj j j j
j
j j
N T N T
T T
τ τ τ τ
= =
∂ ∂
Λ ≡ ∆
∂ ∂∑ ∑
 
     (13) 
is the part of the gain in productivity that is not internalized in wages.  
 
A proof of this lemma is deferred to the Appendix.  
 Expression (11) decomposes the total cost of a rise in τi into two city-specific or local 
effects and an effect at the system level. The first term reflects the loss of surplus at the fringe 
of city i. It equals the reduction in urban land multiplied by the gap between its value and the 
opportunity cost, which by condition (3) is identical to τi in equilibrium. The second term, the 
fall in population multiplied by the marginal-average productivity gap, reflects the loss in 
urban productivity insofar as it is not internalized in wages. However, the households that 
leave city i will locate in another city in the system and induce an expansion of urban land use 
and the workforce. Surplus will rise to the extent that the value of land in urban use exceeds 
opportunity costs and the marginal product of labour exceeds the average product in 
destination cities. The parameter Λ may thus be interpreted as a shadow price of constraint 
                                                 
6
 Of course, if the precise nature of agglomeration externalities is known and instruments that address them in a 
more direct fashion are available, these should be preferred over adjustment of land use policy.  
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(8), since it is equal to the gain in surplus from one additional household in the system. Note 
that in the absence of external agglomeration economies, this shadow price vanishes if 
development taxes are set at their first-best level (i.e., zero).  
 By evaluating the total derivative in (11) at 0τ =

, we obtain the following 
proposition, which sheds light on how the presence of agglomeration externalities changes the 
desirable level of growth controls relative their first-best levels.  
 
Proposition 1: In a system general equilibrium for a fixed number of cities, we have: 
( )
0
0 i
i
SS
τ
τ
τ
=
∂
> ⇔ ∆ < ∆
∂ 

,        (14) 
where  
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
, ,n nj j j j
j
j j
N T N T
T T
τ τ τ τ
= =
∂ ∂
∆ ≡ ∆
∂ ∂∑ ∑
 
       (15) 
is a weighted average of ∆j over all cities in the system. 
 
This proposition states that social surplus rises by decreasing (increasing) development taxes 
relative to their first-best levels if the marginal-average productivity gap is larger (smaller) 
than a weighted average. The weights relate to the cost of drawing more households to a city. 
Intuitively, in the absence of first-best instruments to internalize agglomeration economies, 
land use constraints may thus be used to direct households from cities where the marginal-
average productivity gap is relatively low towards cities where it is relatively high. By 
implication, agglomeration externalities do not affect the optimal development tax in a city in 
which this gap equals the weighted system average. Furthermore, the gain in surplus that may 
be brought about by tailoring land use policy to these externalities depends on variation in the 
marginal-average productivity gap across cities. In a system of identical cities, this instrument 
would not be helpful, since the gain from relaxing the development tax in one place would be 
exactly offset by the loss in productivity elsewhere. 
 Lemma 1 may also be used to characterize the first-order conditions for optimal land 
use policy, as stated in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2: In a system general equilibrium for a fixed number of cities, first-order 
conditions for optimal land use policy are given by: 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), , , 0i i ii i
i i i
S T N T N Tτ τ τ τ τ τ
τ
τ τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂
+ ∆ − Λ =
∂ ∂ ∂
  
    (16) 
for each city i.  
 
It should be noted that, depending on the functional form of ( )g N , the set of conditions (16) 
may not suffice to identify a unique global optimum.  
 
3.3 City creation 
 
Suppose that the set of n cities consists of k heterogeneous and m identical or replicable cities, 
for which all urban parameters are the same as for the kth city, with n k m= + . As long as we 
keep the number of cities fixed, this is a special case of the model that was previously 
discussed and all results we obtained continue to apply. Now we endogenize the number of 
replicable cities m. There is an annualized fixed cost K to creating a new city, which augments 
the conversion costs per unit of land. Replicates are set up by competitive urban developers, 
but the system planner determines development taxes and a tax µ on city creation.7 The 
variable m will be treated as continuous and strictly positive.  
 Free entry of urban developers ensures the following zero-profit condition: 
( )( ) ( )
( ),
0
, ,
F
k kr T
k k k kr T C L r dr K
τ
τ µΨ − = +∫ .       (17) 
For each τk and µ, this condition fixes a unique transfer level ( ),kT τ µ .8 In this setting, the 
population constraint may be written as: 
( )( ) ( )( )
1
, , , ,
k
i i k k k k
i
N T mN T Nτ τ µ τ τ µ
=
+ =∑ ,      (18) 
which implicitly determines the number of replicates ( ),m τ µ . Intuitively, as long as 
( ),kT T τ µ> , developers will find it profitable to build a new replicate city, since the total 
differential land rent it generates exceeds the fixed cost and tax. However, as the number of 
replicates increases, the transfer must decline in order for the population constraint to be 
satisfied. A similar reasoning applies for the case ( ),kT T τ µ< . Hence, we may define the 
                                                 
7
 In this context, competitive means that developers treat the transfer (or utility level) as given. This means that 
we rule out strategic growth controls, such as studied in Brueckner (1995) or Helsley and Strange (1995).  
8
 This can be seen by noting that the total differential land rent is monotonously increasing in the transfer and 
that it is infinitely small (large) for a an infinitely large negative (positive) transfer. 
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system general equilibrium for an endogenous number of cities as a set of op city general 
equilibrium allocations for k heterogeneous cities and ( ),m τ µ  replicates, evaluated at 
( ),kT τ µ . Social surplus equals: 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
, ,
1 0
, ,
0
, , , ,
                    , , , ,
                    , , .
F
i i k
F
k k k
r Tk
i i k i i
i
r T
k k k k k
k
SS r T C L r dr
m r T C L r dr
k m K NT
τ τ µ
τ τ µ
τ µ τ τ µ
τ µ τ τ µ
τ µ τ µ
=
= Ψ −
+ Ψ −
− + −
∑ ∫
∫



   (19) 
 First-order conditions for optimal land use policy are characterised in the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 3: In a system general equilibrium for an endogenous number of cities, first-
order conditions for optimal land use policy are given by: 
( )( ) , ,k k kN Tµ τ τ µ= Λ ,         (20) 
where Λ  is the shadow price associated with population constraint (18), and: 
( )( ) ( )( )

( )( ), , , , , , 0i k i k i ki i
i i i
S T N T N Tτ τ µ τ τ µ τ τ µ
τ
τ τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂
+ ∆ − Λ =
∂ ∂ ∂
   (21) 
for each city i.  
 
While a formal proof of these results is deferred to the Appendix, they may be well 
understood by revisiting the case of a fixed number of cities. First, observe that expression 
(21) is virtually identical to expression (16), the only difference being that the shadow price 
refers to the slightly reformulated population constraint. The conditions that characterize 
optimal development taxes are the same for a system with a fixed number of cities as for a 
system in which this number is chosen optimally. This is an immediate application of the 
Envelope Theorem. If the number of cities is chosen optimally, then entry or exit of cities 
should not contribute to social surplus at the margin. Hence, the marginal effect of a rise in τi 
on the number of cities in the system should leave surplus unaffected. This number may thus 
as well be treated as constant. By implication, Proposition 1 holds as well: development taxes 
should be adjusted relative to their first-best levels in order to direct households towards cities 
with a high marginal-average productivity gap.  
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 Now consider the margin of city creation. Each new city reduces the population in the 
existing system with ( )( ), ,k k kN Tτ τ µ  households, thus reducing productivity and surplus at 
the fringe of existing cities. The reduction in surplus equals the shadow price of the 
population constraint times this number of households. It is these costs that the tax in 
expression (20) internalizes. Intuitively, by reducing the number of cities in the system, this 
tax improves exploitation of agglomeration externalities in existing cities. It should be noted 
that if the variation in the marginal-average productivity gap across cities is sufficiently small, 
the tax on city creation dominates development taxes as an instrument to internalize 
agglomeration externalities. In the limiting case of a system of identical cities, this tax is even 
a perfect substitute for the wage subsidy that would be implemented in a first-best world.  
 
3.4 Decentralization to urban developers 
 
What land use policy will result if development taxes are set by competitive urban 
developers? A competitive urban developer would maximize the total differential land rent in 
his city, while treating it as open by taking T (or utility) as given. The next proposition 
characterizes the first-order condition associated with this problem.  
 
Proposition 4: In an open city general equilibrium, the first-order condition for the 
development tax that optimizes the total differential land rent in city i is given by: 
( ) ( ), , 0i ii i
i i
S T N Tτ τ
τ
τ τ
∂ ∂
+ ∆ =
∂ ∂
.        (22) 
 
A proof is deferred to the Appendix. Since ( ),i iS Tτ τ∂ ∂  is negative and the second term of 
(22) is negative as well, it can be seen that τi should be adjusted downwardly relative to its 
first-best level. This contrasts the adjustment as described in Proposition 1, where 
development taxes should increase in some cities and decrease in others, according to their 
marginal-average productivity gap. Intuitively, competitive urban developers would subsidize 
land until at the margin, the gap between opportunity costs and urban land value, multiplied 
by the change in land use induced by subsidizing it even further, offsets the part of 
productivity gains that is not internalized in wages.  
 The implication of Proposition 4 is that implementation of optimal land use policy in a 
system with an endogenous number of cities, as characterized by Proposition 3, requires 
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coordination at the system level. It cannot be decentralized to urban developers who 
maximize the total differential land rent in their specific city.  In particular, by ignoring the 
term  ( )( ), ,i k iN Tτ τ µ τ−Λ ∂ ∂ , which makes the difference between conditions (21) and (22), 
urban developers fail to take into account the cost that a development subsidy imposes on 
other cities in the system. Households that are attracted by the subsidy reduce productivity 
and surplus at the fringe of other cities. In an attempt to reap the benefits of agglomeration, 
developers engage in suboptimal ‘land tax competition’.  
 We now turn to the case in which coordination of development taxes at the system 
level is impossible. Planning at the system level cannot correct or overrule the development 
taxes that are set by competitive urban developers according to condition (22). Is it still 
beneficial in this situation to restrict city creation?   
 
Proposition 5: In a system general equilibrium for an endogenous number of cities, if 
development taxes are set according to condition (22) in all cities, then the shadow price 
of the population constraint vanishes and social surplus cannot be raised by imposing a 
tax on city creation. 
 
A proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix. The intuitive explanation is that by 
setting land use policy according to condition (22), urban developers second-best optimize the 
number of households in their city, so that there is no gain (loss) of a marginal rise (fall) in 
this number. Hence, in this equilibrium, the external effect of creating new cities vanishes as 
well and taxing it does not raise social surplus.  
 It turns out that the reverse holds as well. Welfare cannot be raised by correcting 
development taxes that urban developers would choose in existing cities, i.e. cities for which 
the fixed cost has already been incurred, if taxing city creation is either legally or practically 
unfeasible.  
 
Proposition 6: In a system general equilibrium for an endogenous number of cities, if 
there is no tax on city creation, then for existing cities, the first-order condition for the 
development tax that optimizes social surplus (21) is identical to the first-order condition 
for the development tax that optimizes its total differential land rent (22).  
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We consider the development tax in city i unequal to k, since existing replicate cities can be 
included in the class of heterogeneous cities without loss of generality. Intuitively, a rise in τi 
does not affect other existing cities, since T only depends on τk and µ trough the zero-profit 
condition (17). The only impact beyond city i is an increase in the number of replicates. 
However, a marginal change in m does not affect social surplus if µ is set equal to zero: the 
rise in total differential land rent is exactly offset by fixed setup costs. Hence, in this 
equilibrium, a change in τi only affects surplus through a change in the total differential land 
rent in city i, so a competitive urban developer would internalize all its costs and benefits. 
This statement cannot be extended to the marginal city, since the developer could effectively 
regulate entry by intervening with its development tax. A more formal proof is again provided 
in the Appendix.  
 The overall implication of Propositions 4, 5 and 6 is that for the implementation of an 
optimal planning policy that satisfies the conditions specified in Proposition 3, a strong degree 
of coordination or planning at the system level is required. The creation of new cities has to 
be taxed or constrained and the owners or governments of specific cities have to be refrained 
from engaging in harmful land tax competition. If it is impossible to meet either of these 
conditions, a constrained optimum may be attained by allowing cities to impose development 
taxes that serve their own interests and by allowing for free entry of new urban developers.  
 Finally, while so far we have maintained the assumption that the number of 
households in the system is fixed, it is useful to briefly consider the implications of relaxing 
it. The opposite extreme would be the presence of a rural sector in which returns to scale are 
constant, so that there is a perfectly elastic supply of households to the system of cities. In this 
case, constraints on city creation raise the number of households in the rural sector, yet they 
leave the size of remaining cities unaffected. Hence, even if taxing city creation were legally 
and practically feasible, it would be ineffective in furthering the exploitation of external 
agglomeration economies. Since there would still be a cost in terms of foregone surplus in 
new cities, it is optimal not to impose a tax on city creation at all. However, in the absence of 
such a tax, it follows from Proposition 6 that allowing for decentralized setting of 
development taxes yields an optimal outcome. In other words, if there is a perfectly elastic 
supply of households from a rural sector, then the decentralized outcome is second-best.  
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4 Application to the Dutch Randstad Area 
 
Figure 1 shows a map of the Dutch Randstad Area that highlights the seven cities to which we 
will apply our analysis.9 The number of households and the surface of the residential area in 
each city are indicated in Table 1. While the distance between these cities is relatively small, 
commuting patterns suggest that they should not be regarded as one integrated spatial labour 
market (see e.g., RPB, 2006). The two largest cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, only 75 
kilometres apart, are comparable in terms of population size and in terms of total land cover, 
while the third largest city of The Hague is more than half as large as Amsterdam. Hence, an 
urban primate hardly exists and the even size distribution of these cities defies Zipf’s law.  
If the origins of this remarkable urban constellation are historical, land use regulation 
has contributed significantly to maintaining or even reinforcing its character (see also 
Vermeulen and Van Ommeren, 2009). Figure 1 indicates boundaries of the so-called Green 
Heart, an area consisting of predominantly open space that Dutch planning policy has striven 
to preserve since the 1950s, and of Buffer zones that are especially designated to prevent the 
conglomeration of cities. The gap between the value of residential and agricultural land at 
these boundaries indicates that they do impose binding constraints on land use. The fourth 
column of Table 1 shows tentative estimates of this gap for each of the seven cities.10 At the 
fringe of Amsterdam, the annual rent of a square meter of land in residential use appears to be 
almost 13€ higher than the sum of the agricultural land rent and annualized conversion costs, 
which corresponds to a regulatory tax rate on housing of almost 30%. However, the implied 
regulatory tax rate in Rotterdam is only about 7%, pointing to a substantial degree of 
heterogeneity across cities in the extent to which land use constraints are binding.11  
                                                 
9
 The delineation of these cities, as indicated in Figure 1, is based on the concept of urban agglomerations (in 
Dutch: ‘grootstedelijke agglomeraties’), which has been proposed by Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2005). These 
urban agglomerations consist of several municipalities and the (morphological) criterion for inclusion of a 
municipality is contiguity of build-up land.  
10
 RIGO (2003) estimates the costs and benefits of residential development projects at various sites in the 
Randstad area. We have selected sites near the fringe of each city. For instance, for the city of Amsterdam we 
have used the site ‘Bovenkerkerpolder’ at its southern boundary. The report provides estimates of location-
specific costs of acquiring and converting the land, as well as its value after development, so an indication of the 
shadow price may be obtained by subtracting the former from the latter. While the standard project used by 
RIGO contains a social housing share of 30%, we assume that land is only developed in its most profitable use. 
The regulatory tax rate is obtained by dividing the shadow price by the value of land inclusive of residential 
structures. Of course, these estimates are contingent on the specific choice of development sites, as well as a 
range of additional assumptions, so they should be interpreted with considerable caution.  
11
 A comparison with regulatory tax rates reported for selected US metropolitan areas in Glaeser et al. (2005) 
indicates that land use controls in Amsterdam, The Hague and Leiden are at least as restrictive as in Boston, New 
York and Washington D.C., whereas only San Francisco and San Jose appear to conduct policies that are 
significantly more restrictive than the city of Amsterdam. 
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Preservation of open space is an important motivation for the land use constraints that 
Figure 1 illustrates. Focussing on land use policy as a second-best instrument in the presence 
of external agglomeration economies, our theoretical analysis has ignored any external value 
of open space. The purpose of this application is to illustrate the theoretical findings and 
provide a quantitative intuition. Hence, we simply assume that the use-constrained land has an 
existence value to society as open space that is exactly equal to the observed regulatory tax, 
i.e. development taxes are set at their first-best levels by assumption. In the baseline scenario, 
we similarly assume that there is no tax on city creation. We then use the calibrated model to 
show how land use policy should be adjusted relative to this first-best policy as a consequence 
of agglomeration externalities and we also compute the cost of failing to do so.  
 
4.1 Choice of functional forms and parameters 
 
Household utility is the product of a CES component in land and the composite commodity 
and the amenity level in the city of residence: 
( ) ( )1, ,u s z A A z s ρρ ρα β= + ,        (23) 
where 1α β+ = . We assume an elasticity of substitution ( )1 1σ ρ= −  of 0.5, so households 
are less willing to substitute away from land than in the Cobb-Douglass case and constraints 
on the availability of land have a stronger impact on wellbeing. The parameters in this 
function are calibrated on data for the city of Amsterdam: A is normalized to unity for this 
city, u is chosen such that the number of households Ni predicted by the model equals the 
observation in Table 1 at T = 0 and the choice of α ensures that the surface of the residential 
area Si is consistent with this table as well. Table 2 reports these and other system-wide 
parameters.  
 The urban production function is given as: 
( ) NCNNF κ= ,          (24) 
where κ is the elasticity of average labour productivity with respect to urban scale – the 
number of households or jobs in the city. Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey the early 
literature on this elasticity as indicating that doubling city size raises productivity by an 
amount that ranges from roughly 3 to 8%. However, these studies did not control for 
unobserved factors, such as the composition of the local workforce, that recent work has 
shown to result in downward bias (see in particular Combes et al., 2008). Therefore, we 
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somewhat conservatively choose κ = 0.02.12 The constant C is chosen such that in the baseline 
equilibrium, the predicted wage in Amsterdam equals the average disposable household 
income in this city in 2002, as estimated from a household survey.  
 In each city i, the amount of developable land at distance r from the CBD is given by: 
( ) 2i iL r rpiω= ,          (25) 
where ωi is taken from Table 1 – it turns out that this parameter is quite homogeneous over 
cities. The annualized shadow price τi and the sum of the agricultural land rent and the 
annualized conversion costs Ci, given in the final two columns of Table 1, are also observed. 
The transport cost parameter t is calibrated such that the average percentage decline in land 
rents per unit of distance from the CBD in the model coincides with an estimated semi-
elasticity of land rents with respect to distance in Amsterdam.13 This land rent gradient may 
not only reflect transport costs to the centre, but also the distribution of jobs and amenities 
within the city.  
 The amenity level in cities other than Amsterdam is calibrated so that the number of 
households in the model matches the data in Table 1. Given our choice of production 
function, this assumption immediately yields wages in the other cities and given the choice of 
other parameters, we also obtain the surface of the residential area. The outcome is shown in 
Table 3. It turns out that there are substantial differences in the attractiveness of cities in other 
dimensions than the wage level. For instance, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are almost equally 
large and hence, in our model, wages are almost equal in these two cities. However, given the 
much lower shadow price in Rotterdam, land rents are calibrated to be substantially lower 
here. The lower willingness to pay for land must be driven by a consumption disadvantage, as 
captured by the amenity level in our model. The difference reported in Table 3 is equivalent to 
a 8.7% reduction in income.  
 The almost perfect correlation of actual with predicted surface of the residential area in 
Tables 1 and 3 respectively provides a crude validation of our calibration. If we divide by the 
number of households to obtain actual and predicted average lot size, the correlation is 0.86.  
 We assume that the smallest city in the system, Haarlem, is replicable. In the baseline 
scenario on which we calibrate our model, there is no tax on city creation. This means that the 
                                                 
12
 In an applied general equilibrium analysis of US county-level employment, Chatterjee (2006) also chooses a 
scale-elasticity of 0.02, following essentially the same line of reasoning. This study illustrates that such a 
seemingly small elasticity can still have a substantial impact on the spatial distribution of jobs.   
13
 Land rents were obtained from housing transactions by estimating the local willingness to pay for land. The 
‘Dam square’ was chosen as centre of Amsterdam. We found that land rents declined with 10% per kilometre of 
distance from this square.  
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fixed cost K of creating a new city must equal the surplus in Haarlem and that the number of 
replicates m is large enough to accommodate the total number of households in the Ranstad 
area. 
 The inverse urban labour demand and supply functions that were defined in equations 
(5) and (7) are shown in Figure 2 for the calibrated model. For each city, the inverse labour 
supply function cuts the inverse labour demand function twice. At its first intersection, the 
average product of labour rises faster than the cost of ensuring that the marginal household 
attains utility u, so this equilibrium cannot be stable. However, at the second intersection, the 
marginal cost curve rises faster than the average product curve, so that this is the only stable 
equilibrium.  
Figure 2 also shows the marginal product of labour. The difference between this curve 
and the average product, defining i∆ , is seen to rise with city size. Hence, Proposition 1 
implies that the planner should relax land use constraints in the largest cities and make them 
more stringent in the smallest ones, inducing a more skewed size distribution. However, the 
variation in i∆  across cities appears to be moderate, so that it seems unlikely that much can 
be gained from these policy adjustments in terms of surplus.  
 
4.2 Comparative statics at the baseline equilibrium 
 
For each city, Table 4 decomposes the total impact on surplus from a marginal rise in the 
development tax, as derived in Lemma 1, relative to the baseline equilibrium. The first 
column reports the reduction in surplus at the urban fringe, which by assumption would be 
exactly offset by the existence value of the land that is preserved from development. By 
implication it must hold that 1 0Λ = , since the same offsetting effect is present at the fringe of 
the cities to which the households from city i are diverted. Hence, the total impact on social 
surplus shown in the fourth column results from i i iN τ∆ ∂ ∂  and 2 i iN τ−Λ ∂ ∂ , the loss and 
gains in uninternalized productivity in city i and elsewhere in the system that are reported in 
columns two and three.  
 Bearing in mind the positive relationship between city size and the marginal-average 
productivity gap in Figure 2, the signs of iSS τ∂ ∂ for the different cities confirm Proposition 
1: social surplus rises from a decline in the development tax in relatively large cities and a rise 
in the development tax in relatively small cities. However, in all cities, the magnitude of the 
net effect is small relative to its constituent terms. Gains and losses in productivity appear to 
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cancel out by and large. This is an implication of the limited variation in the marginal-average 
productivity gap, resulting from the constant and relatively low scale elasticity.  
 The comparative static results in Table 4 also shed light on the relative importance of 
foregone agglomeration benefits, compared to the magnitude of i i iSτ τ∂ ∂ . The foregone 
surplus on constrained land exceeds the external productivity loss in all cities and in most of 
them, the difference is substantial. Hence, a misperception of the external value of open 
space, arbitrarely assumed to offset these costs in our analysis, could easily dominate the 
social cost of land use constraints.  
 At the baseline equilibrium, Λ2 equals 467 euro, or 1.9% of the average disposable 
household income in Amsterdam. This external effect from reducing the number of 
households in the system may be regarded as substantial. Although Table 4 indicates that 
development taxes are of little help in addressing it, a significant scope for policies that 
constrain city creation is implied.  
 
4.3 Counterfactual analysis 
 
Table 5 shows how land use policy should be adjusted relative to the first-best as a 
consequence of external agglomeration benefits. The third column reports the second-best 
policy that is characterised in Proposition 3. Columns one and four contrast this policy to the 
baseline and the first-best policy, in which labour is paid its marginal product. The 
constrained optimal policy, in which development taxes are set by competitive developers 
according to Proposition 4 and in which there is no tax on city creation, is characterised in the 
second column. The table also documents the equilibrium allocations of households over 
cities, for which Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration, the total usage of urban land and 
social surplus.  
 As expected, the second-best land use policy consists of a substantial tax on city 
creation, being almost as large as the fixed setup cost, and a minor adjustment of development 
taxes in line with Proposition 1. This policy leads to a major reduction in the number of 
replicates, thus boosting the number of households in the remaining cities: the population size 
in these cities rises with 46% on average. Thus, although there is hardly any need to adjust 
development taxes, direct land use constraints should be substantially adjusted relative to the 
baseline scenario, in order to allow for these additional households. The resulting allocation is 
nearly identical to the distribution of households in the first-best equilibrium. In the 
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constrained optimum, development taxes are substantially lower than their first-best levels in 
all cities, leading to an average population increase of 35%. Since growth of existing cities 
reduces the profitability of city creation, the number of replicates is significantly reduced 
relative to the baseline scenario, though not to the same extent as in the second-best outcome.  
 The total amount of land in urban use reduces substantially by moving from the 
baseline to the first or second-best equilibrium. The reason is that by concentrating the 
population into a smaller number of larger cities, these policies will push up land prices and 
hence induce a substitution towards the consumption of the composite commodity. This effect 
is also present in the constrained optimal allocation, but it is more than offset by the distorting 
impact of land subsidies on city size. Hence, in this equilibrium, average density goes down 
rather than up. These results are also noteworthy in the context of perceived excessive sprawl 
in US cities, as discussed in the introduction.  
 Table 5 finally reports the social surplus generated in each equilibrium. The gain that 
can be realized by moving from the baseline scenario to the first-best allocation amounts to 
233 million Euro annually, or 0.31% of the value of the total produce. Unsurprisingly, the 
second-best land use policy that leads to an almost identical allocation, also yields virtually 
the same surplus gain. However, 80% of this surplus gain can still be realised in the 
constrained optimum, in which either the tax on city creation is unavailable or coordination of 
development taxes at the system level is impossible.  
 
 
5 Conclusions and discussion 
 
We have explored the properties of land use policy as a second-best instrument in the 
presence of urban agglomeration externalities. It has been shown that a tax on city creation 
enhances exploitation of agglomeration benefits by raising the average size of remaining 
cities, while city-specific taxes or subsidies on development further improve the allocation by 
directing people towards those cities where the externality is largest. Land tax competition by 
urban developers may undermine the second-best allocation. Taxing city creation is 
undesirable if this kind of competition cannot be curbed through coordination at the system 
level, whereas decentralized setting of development taxes yields a constrained optimal 
outcome if the tax on city creation is unavailable.  
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 Compared to the first-best wage subsidy, which would address the marginal-average 
productivity gap in each city specifically, the tax on city creation is crude in that it ignores the 
variation in this gap across cities, yet a development tax or subsidy is crude in that it distorts 
the size of cities in terms of total land use. Hence, constraining city creation turns out to be 
the dominant second-best instrument if variation in the marginal-average productivity gap is 
limited. This insight appears to be new in the urban economics literature, yet three qualifying 
remarks are in order. In the first place, variation in the scale elasticity across cities may be 
larger in reality than assumed in our calibration, which would shift the balance between the 
instruments. In the second place, our model ignores the rural sector. Constraints on city 
creation become ineffective in furthering the exploitation of external agglomeration 
economies if they merely raise the number of households in the countryside, so that the 
constrained optimal policy becomes the second-best. Finally, a corrective policy in opposite 
direction may be called for if coordination problems hamper the process of city formation. Put 
differently, the need for governments to support the process of city creation is mitigated or 
may even be reversed in the presence of external agglomeration economies.  
 While the focus of this paper has been on agglomeration externalities in production, 
the same analysis could equally be applied to agglomeration externalities in consumption, 
which are believed to be of increasing importance for urban success (Glaeser et al., 2001). 
Local goods and services that are produced with increasing returns to scale will be 
underprovided, if they are priced at average rather than marginal costs. For instance, the 
provision of public transportation may involve substantial fixed investments that are partly 
recouped from user fees. Any fixed costs faced by theatres or restaurants will also likely 
contribute to the price of tickets and menus. In bigger cities such fixed costs are spread over a 
larger number of users, yet the marginal resident does not internalize the benefit this entails 
for other households in the city. Land use policies should be adjusted to such external 
agglomeration economies in consumption in the same way as in the case of an agglomeration 
externality in production, thus enhancing the quality and variety of local consumer goods and 
services.14  
 Urban growth may also induce negative externalities like traffic congestion, pollution 
and crime. The urban production function in our theoretical analysis could be altered to reflect 
these externalities, without fundamentally changing the analysis. What would change is the 
                                                 
14
 See for instance Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004) for a discussion of the isomorphisms between urban models 
with a Marsshallian externality in production, models with a local public good and models with a demand for 
product variety. 
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comparative statics: city creation should be subsidized and if such were impossible, urban 
development should be taxed if negative externalities were predominant. Whether the positive 
or negative externalities of cities dominate is in the end an empirical matter.  
   
 
Appendix: Proofs of propositions 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: In order to compute the total derivative of ( )SS τ  with regard to τi, it is 
convenient to consider: 
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This expression decomposes the impact of a change in τi into a city-specific and a system-
level effect. We proceed by determining all of its components. First, it follows from Leibniz’s 
rule that:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ),
0
, , , ,
F
i ir T
i i i i
i i
i i i
SS T S T r T
L r dr
τ
τ τ τ
τ
τ τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂Ψ
= +
∂ ∂ ∂∫

,     (A3) 
where the first term has been simplified using the boundary condition (3) and the definition 
for surface of the residential area (4). The second term may be simplified in a number of 
steps: 
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The first step uses the fact that a change in τi affects the bid rent only through its impact on 
wages. The second step uses the derivative of the bid rent to the wage from (1) and the 
condition that labour gets paid its average product. The third step uses the equality 
( ) ( ) ( )' 'F N g N g N N= +  and the definition of ∆i.  
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 In order to determine the second term of expression (A2), we note that implicit 
differentiation of the population constraint (8) yields: 
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Furthermore, we again apply Leibniz’s rule in order to derive: 
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where the first term has been simplified in the same way as in (A3). Noting that: 
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we may simplify the second term of expression (A6) as: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
,
0
, , ,
,
F
j jr T
j j j j
j j j j
r
r T N T
L r dr N T
T T
τ τ τ
τ
=
∂Ψ ∂
= + ∆
∂ ∂∫
,     (A8) 
using essentially the same steps as in (A4). Substitution yields: 
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Collecting all components and substituting them back into (A2), while using the definition of 
Λ, we obtain expression (11), which was to be demonstrated.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: We establish this proposition by computing derivatives of social 
surplus with regard to µ and τi and equating them to zero. First, social surplus is redefined as: 
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where ( ) ( )( ), , , ,kSS SS Tτ µ τ µ τ µ=  . This allows us to write: 
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The proof will proceed by deriving all components of this expression. First, by making use of 
the zero profit condition (17), we note that: 
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Implicit differentiation of the population constraint (18) yields: 
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Following essentially the same derivation as in Lemma 1, we obtain:  
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Substitution into (A11) yields: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ), ,, ,k k kSS mN Tτ µ τ µµ τ τ µµ µ∂ ∂= − Λ∂ ∂
 
,                (A15) 
where Λ  is the shadow price of the population constraint (18), given by: 

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Hence, the first-order condition for optimal taxation of city creation reads: 
( )( ) , ,k k kN Tµ τ τ µ= Λ ,                   (A17) 
or city creation should be taxed with the (shadow) price of taking away one household from 
the existing system of cities, multiplied by the size of the marginal city.  
 Now consider the derivative of social surplus with regard to τi, for i unequal to k. Since 
( ),kT τ µ  is independent of τi, we may write: 
( ) ( ), , ,
i i
SS SS Tτ µ τ µ
τ τ
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
 
,                   (A18) 
the right-hand side of which equals: 
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F
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r T C L r dr
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τ µ τ µ
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The first term of this expression is already familiar from the proof of Lemma 1. The second 
term is obtained by implicit differentiation of (18), yielding:  
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Substituting into (A18), while making use of (A17), we obtain: 
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yielding the familiar first-order condition: 
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 Differentiating social surplus with regard to τk yields the impact on surplus of a 
simultaneous marginal increase of the development tax in all replicate cities. We have: 
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k k k
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The first term of this expression is given by: 
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Again, by implicit differentiation of (18) we obtain: 
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Hence, using (A14) and (A17), the second term of expression (A24) equals: 
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Since the first term of this expression cancels out against the third term of (A23), substitution 
yields:  
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Hence, we obtain the first order condition: 
( )( ) ( )( )

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which completes the proof.  
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Proof of Proposition 4: We write the total differential land rent in city i as: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ),
0
, , ,
F
i ir T
i i i i i iTDR T r T C L r dr
τ
τ τ= Ψ −∫ .                (A29) 
By applying Leibniz’s rule and the same steps as in (A3) and (A4), we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ), , ,i i i
i i
i i i
TDR T S T N Tτ τ τ
τ
τ τ τ
∂ ∂ ∂
= + ∆
∂ ∂ ∂
.                  (A30) 
The proof is competed by setting this derivative equal to zero.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5: We start by observing that in the derivation of the optimal tax on city 
creation in the proof of Proposition 3, no specific assumptions about τ  have been made, so 
development taxes may be chosen such that they satisfy (22). Substitution of this condition 
into expression (A16) yields  0Λ = . Substitution into (A17) yields 0µ = .  
 
Proof of Proposition 6: For city i k≠ , condition (A19) reduces to condition (A30) if we 
substitute 0µ = . Hence, the first-order condition that obtains by setting (A18) to zero must be 
the same as the first-order condition that obtains by setting (A30) to zero. From inspection of 
(A23), it can be seen that the same argument does not work for city k, since a marginal change 
in τk also affects ( ),kT τ µ . 
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Table 1: City-specific data 
City  Ni 
(households) 
Si 
(hectares) 
ωi 
(%) 
τi 
(€ / m2) 
Ci 
(€ / m2) 
Amsterdam 527086 7964 18 12.71 4.06 
Rotterdam 476514 8553 18 2.36 3.76 
The Hague 305393 5355 24 8.20 3.96 
Utrecht 191066 3837 22 5.41 4.12 
Leiden 114024 2467 25 9.11 4.19 
Dordrecht 102280 2751 15 4.20 4.23 
Haarlem 89029 2205 26 5.43 3.89 
Note: The number of households, the surface of the residential area and the share of the total surface that is in 
residential use are obtained from Statistics Netherlands. The population data refer to 2002 and the land use data 
refer to 2003. The annualized shadow price of land use constraints and sum of opportunity and conversion costs 
were derived by the author based on data in RIGO (2003), see the main text for details. 
 
Table 2: System-wide parameters 
Description of parameter Value 
α preference parameter composite commodity 0.9977 
β preference parameter land 0.0023 
σ elasticity of substitution 0.5 
u utility level 13034 
T transfer 0 
C constant in production function 18441 
κ scale elasticity 0.02 
t transport cost (€ / m) 0.450 
K annualized fixed cost (million €) 68.50 
N total number of households in the system 3197340 
m number of replicates 15.63 
 discount rate 0.05 
Note: Transport costs and the number of households in the Randstad area are based on actual 
data, the other parameters have been calibrated as explained in the main text. Land rents on 
which t is estimated were derived from housing transactions data of the Dutch Realtors 
Association (NVM) and household data are from Statistics Netherlands. We use the same 
delineation of the Randstad area as in Vermeulen and Van Ommeren (2009). 
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Table 3: The baseline equilibrium 
City  wi 
(€) 
Ai 
 
Si 
(hectare) 
Amsterdam 24000 1 7964 
Rotterdam 23952 0.913 10429 
The Hague 23739 0.901 6021 
Utrecht 23518 0.861 4373 
Leiden 23276 0.866 2411 
Dordrecht 23226 0.848 2516 
Haarlem 23161 0.824 2274 
Note: The wage in Amsterdam equals the average disposable household 
income in this city as observed from the ‘Woning Behoefte Onderzoek’ 
survey in 2002. The Amsterdam amenity level is normalized to one. The 
surface of the residential area in this city corresponds to its observed value, 
as reported in Table 1. See the main tax for details on how outcomes for the 
other cities were obtained.  
 
Table 4: Comparative statics at baseline equilibrium (in M€) 
City  i
i
i
S
τ
τ
∂
∂
 
i
i
i
N
τ
∂∆
∂
 2
i
i
N
τ
∂
−Λ
∂
 
i
SS
τ
∂
∂
 
Amsterdam -82.65 -17.79 17.31 -0.49 
Rotterdam -28.50 -19.91 19.40 -0.51 
The Hague -72.90 -19.07 18.75 -0.32 
Utrecht -47.09 -16.04 15.92 -0.12 
Leiden -64.24 -14.81 14.85 0.04 
Dordrecht -25.17 -10.22 10.27 0.05 
Haarlem -47.53 -15.09 15.20 0.12 
Note: Comparative statics at the baseline equilibrium are obtained through simulation with the 
calibrated model. See the main text for details.  
 
 32 
Table 5: Counterfactual analysis 
City Baseline Constrained Second-best First-best 
Development tax (€)     
   Amsterdam   12.71 10.26 12.67 12.71 
   Rotterdam 2.36 0.99 2.34 2.36 
   The Hague   8.20 6.31 8.19 8.20 
   Utrecht     5.41 3.81 5.41 5.41 
   Leiden      9.11 7.24 9.13 9.11 
   Dordrecht   4.20 2.73 4.22 4.20 
   Haarlem     5.43 3.92 5.45 5.43 
 
    
Tax on city creation (M€) 0 0 67.07 0 
 
    
Number of households 
    
   Amsterdam   527086 597130 631293 631867 
   Rotterdam 476514 516159 560539 561155 
   The Hague   305393 364872 391518 391700 
   Utrecht     191066 233685 253879 253840 
   Leiden      114024 162304 175751 175622 
   Dordrecht   102280 127465 139652 139483 
   Haarlem     89029 128231 141524 141342 
 
    
Number of replicates 15.63 8.32 6.38 6.38 
 
    
Total urban land use (ha) 71543 72802 67725 67724 
 
    
Surplus (G€) 2.20 2.39 2.43 2.43 
Note: Characteristics of counterfactual scenarios, simulated with the calibrated model. See the main text for a 
description of the alternative scenarios. 
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Figure 1: Randstad Holland 
 
Note: Land use in 2003 and boundaries of the urban agglomerations are obtained from Statistics 
Netherlands. Boundaries of the Green Heart area and Buffer zones are based on VROM et al. 
(2004). This map was produced by Spinlab, VU University.  
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Figure 2: Urban labour demand and supply 
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